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Since the early twentieth century Nicaragua, together 
with much of Latin America, has been the focus of the 
political influence of the United States. However, during 
the Cold War the Soviet Union, a new political power of the 
world, demonstrated its influential politics in Latin 
America. The Soviet Union was concentrating political power 
in Latin American countries to spread Marxist ideals. This 
was to combat the influence of the United States and its 
imperialist goals in the region. Nicaragua was a country 
that was on the verge of revolution. The Soviet Union knew 
that if Nicaragua was politically weak from a revolution it 
could use the idea of communism to influence the state. The 
Soviet Union believed that through Cuba it could support 
the revolution of the Sandinista Party. Cuba was known for 
its communist beliefs, which the Soviet Union wanted to 
spread to Nicaragua.   
 What influences impacted the Sandinista Revolution? 
Was the Sandinista Revolution the manifestation of a puppet 
war taking place among multiple forces outside and inside 
of the country itself? Did the United States use its 
relations with Anastasio Somoza Debayle to attempt to 
cripple Fidel Castro's communist Cuba? Also was the Russia-
friendly government in Cuba using the Sandinista Party, and 
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its struggles, to gain a stronger foothold in the area? 
This paper will show that the Sandinista Party incorporated 
the Sandino name to gain more support for its cause.  
 There are many questions as to the causes of the 
Nicaraguan Revolution, yet none are as important as that of 
the role the United States played in the conflict, 
specifically, its involvement in the politics and economic 
matters of Nicaragua and the Nicaraguan government. The 
United States' involvement allowed for the survival of 
particular parties in Nicaragua. In this paper the 
discussion of the causes leading up to the Nicaraguan 
Revolution will indicate that the United States decided the 
fate of the country and those who fought for it. 
 The collapse of the Central American Federation, in 
18381
                                               
1 Benjamin Keen, and Keith Haynes. A History of Latin America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
2000,  469. 
, was the starting point for outside control of 
Nicaragua. This collapse left Nicaragua vulnerable because 
it no longer had the support of neighboring countries. 
Since Nicaragua was vulnerable the country suffered from 
internal strife as well as fear of an outside takeover. The 
main struggle within Nicaragua was a battle between 
conservatives and liberals to maintain political power. 
With the coming of the twentieth century the liberal party 
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of Nicaragua came into power and installed Jose Santos 
Zelaya as the country's president. Zelaya was a progressive 
president who felt that the modernization of Nicaragua must 
be accomplished to ensure its success. Zelaya believed that 
outside investment was the only way to get the process of 
modernization started.2
 Zelaya, feeling the effects of his foreign investors, 
began to fear a growing American imperial takeover, and 
began to stake his country's claim on its own resources.
 Although Zelaya knew the risk of an 
outside takeover, he saw no other way to save the 
Nicaraguan economy without the support of outside 
investors. Therefore, Zelaya encouraged foreign investment 
into Nicaragua. The United States quickly dominated a large 
number of firms and companies within Nicaragua. This 
control allowed the United States to monopolize much of the 
resources in Nicaragua by the early twentieth century. 
3
                                               
2 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
 
This reclaiming of control from the United States, by 
President Zelaya, came to a boil when Zelaya blocked a 
local canal proposed by the United States. At this point, 
the United States found that it would need to remove the 
existing liberal government and replace it with a 
friendlier conservative government.  
3 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
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 In 1909, with American encouragement, a revolt of 
conservatives broke out in Nicaragua.4 The United States 
Marines protected this conservative group in order to 
further the revolt. With the fear of nothing less than full 
scale war Zelaya was forced to resign and conservative 
Adolfo Diaz replaced Zelaya him as president. Diaz, a 
former employee of an American-run firm was given his 
position by the Conservative Party.5
 President Diaz and his new government officials were 
seen by many as a United States puppet regime and they were 
very unpopular with the majority of the Nicaraguan people. 
This lack of support led to several uprisings which were 
resolved by the intervention of United States Marines. In 
return for the protection of the conservative government, 
concessions were made to the United States, the most 
important of these concessions was the Treaty of Bryan-
Chamorro of 1916.
 The party chose Diaz 
because of the strong support the United States showed 
toward him.  
6
                                               
4 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
 This treaty gave the United States sole 
possession of the rights to build a canal through 
Nicaragua. The goal of this treaty was not for the United 
States to build the canal but to keep other countries from 
5 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
6 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
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stepping in and building it. The United States did not want 
other countries to build a canal through Nicaragua because 
it felt that it would take away from some of its power and 
control in Nicaragua. The reason that the United States did 
not build the canal was because of the prior existence of 
the Panama Canal. 
 The United States policy makers finally decided to 
develop a new political strategy towards Nicaragua. So in 
1927 conservatives and liberals signed an agreement to 
provide Nicaragua with presidential elections.7 These 
elections protected an image; they made the Nicaraguan 
people feel as if they were in control of their country's 
politics. The elections would, of course, be held under 
United States supervision. Even though the liberal party 
won back its power with the 1927 elections, the real power 
of Nicaragua was still in the hands of the Americans.8
 This did not sit well with many Nicaraguans, 
especially one in particular. Augusto Cesar Sandino was a 
liberal officer, born to a liberal landowner; his mother 
was a servant of Indian descent.
 The 
power remained with the United States because of its heavy 
political, economic, and military influence in the state.   
9
                                               
7 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
 Sandino worked for several 
8 Benjamin Keen, 470. 
9 Benjamin Keen, 471. 
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companies in Mexico that were American owned following the 
Mexican Revolution. In working for these American 
companies, and seeing their imperialist control in Mexico, 
Sandino decided that he would not sit idly by and watch his 
country be taken over by an imposing American nation. In 
addition to his experience through his employment, Sandino 
was also influenced by the growing radical ideals from post 
revolutionary Mexico.10
 After Sandino's time in Mexico, he returned to 
Nicaragua to join in the rebellion against the puppet 
government in place in Nicaragua. After being unable to 
convince the other liberal officers to give him command of 
the liberal army, Sandino decided to form his own army.
  
11
 Prior to Sandino's successful uprising, the United 
States government created the Nicaraguan National Guard. 
This guard was designed to maintain a political and 
military foothold for the United States in Nicaragua. After 
the withdrawal of the Marines, President Diaz ran against 
 
Sandino's army was composed mainly of poor workers and 
farmers. After seven years of guerilla warfare with the 
Marines, Sandino and his army finally forced the United 
States out of Nicaragua.  
                                               
10 Benjamin Keen, 471. 
11 Benjamin Keen, 471. 
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liberal candidate Juan Sacasa in the 1932 election for 
president.12
 Following the withdrawal of the United States Marines, 
Sacasa demanded that Sandino disarm. However, Sandino 
distrusted both Sacasa and Somoza and refused to give up 
his army. The three men met twice to try to come to an 
agreement for the disarmament of the Sandino-led army. 
After the second meeting, a dinner at the Presidential 
Palace, Somoza reportedly ordered his men to arrest Sandino 
and the officers that had accompanied him. Rather than an 
arrest Sandino, he and the other officers were shot.
 This election was won by Sacasa and was thought 
to have a calming effect in Nicaragua. The United States, 
at the same time, placed in power its pick for the leader 
of the Nicaraguan National Guard, who was a man named 
Anastacio Somoza Garcia.  
13 
Somoza denied responsibility for the murders. After Somoza 
used his power as leader of the National Guard to overthrow 
Sacasa he took full responsibility for the murders.14
                                               
12 Benjamin Keen, 472. 
 As 
Somoza gained control of Nicaragua in 1934 he laid the 
groundwork for the dynasty that he and his sons would rule 
over until 1979. 
13 Benjamin Keen, 472. 
14 Benjamin Keen, 472. 
 9 
 The United States did not fight the Somoza Dynasty, 
mainly because its interests in Nicaragua were safe while 
the Somozas were in power. As the Somoza family ruled, 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia had his two sons training to take 
over the country when he was gone. Somoza's youngest son 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle graduated from West Point Academy, 
one of the United States' most prestigious military 
schools. Luis, the older son, was forced to take command of 
the country after his father's assassination in 1956.15
 Luis and Anastasio controlled power both directly and 
indirectly through puppet presidents that they placed into 
power. Throughout the Somoza rule both of the brothers kept 
a friendly relationship with the United States, which 
allowed both sides to continue making money.
 Due 
to Somoza sending his son to West Point and maintaining 
friendly relations with the United States, the United 
States did not did not fear Somoza taking control of 
Nicaragua.  
16
                                               
15 Benjamin Keen, 472. 
 The Somozas 
were notorious for funneling large amounts of Nicaragua's 
capital into their private accounts. This funneling 
demonstrated the Somoza's complete lack of any presidential 
leadership skills. The majority of the Nicaraguan citizens 
16 Benjamin Keen, 473. 
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began to organize a rebellion against the dictatorship that 
had overtaken their country. Nicaraguan citizens were in 
need of non-United States dominated aid and political 
assistance. They needed new ideas and philosophies, ideas 
like those that the Soviet Union had shared with Cuba.  
The Soviet Union came to Nicaragua with philosophies 
and political ideas that would help to lead Nicaragua to a 
revolution against the United States dominated regime. 
Soviet influence in Latin America and the Western 
Hemisphere started as early as 1920 gaining power and 
momentum with each country that supported its ideals. Some 
Latin American leaders believed in the ideas promoted by 
the Russian Socialist Party, which specifically influenced 
Nicaragua and its communist ideology. Through reading 
Lenin’s "Utopian Socialist Society" many Latin American 
citizens became further supporters of this Russian 
philosophy.17
                                               
17 Danuta Paszyn . The Soviet Attitude to Political and Social Change in Central America, 1979-90. New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 10 
 As political leaders of the Soviet Union began 
to hear rumors of Latin America supporting its ideologies 
they worked to increase its level of involvement in this 
region. The first parties to openly show their Soviet 
connections were, the Socialist Worker's Parties in 
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Argentina (1921) and Uruguay (1920).18 As time went by more 
and more socialist parties sprang up, and, as stated by 
Danuta Paszyn, "by 1930 some form of Communist Party was 
functioning in all of the Latin American countries."19
 With the coming of the 1930's the intensity of the 
Soviet policy toward Latin American revolutions had taken a 
huge step. Joseph Stalin urged many communists to take up 
arms and fight for their own socialist ideals. Stalin 
wanted to encourage, and support, those who were following 
the socialist theory. Soon after, Farabundo Augustin Martí, 
the leader of the Salvadoran Communist Party, started an 
armed uprising in 1932 in El Salvador. In El Salvador there 
was an extreme divide between the wealthy and the poor. 
This set up the perfect conditions for a socialist doctrine 
to thrive. Paszyn shows in the following the extremes that 
lead to the uprising;  
 This 
infiltration of Soviet doctrine soon would lead to a full 
scale revolution throughout the region.  
 In El Salvador a small elite group of land owners, 30 
 to 40 families, controlled nearly all the arable soil, 
 which constituted 60 percent of all of the land, and 
 dominated all spheres of Salvadoran society.20
 
 
                                               
18 Danuta Paszyn, 11 
19 Danuta Paszyn., 12 
20 Danuta Paszyn, 14  
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With the conditions of most Latin American countries 
becoming closer and closer to that of El Salvador an 
uprising in Nicaragua was sure to occur. However, little 
could happen in Nicaragua until 27 years later when the 
Cuban Revolution was achieved. 
 The Cuban Revolution overthrew the Batista regime in 
1959. This was the first successful communist revolution 
achieved in Latin America. It was this revolution that 
allowed the Soviet Union to gain an important ally in its 
efforts to its spread socialist ideals. Castro, the 
president of Cuba, by this time had made Cuba a political 
weapon for the Soviet Union. The two countries set their 
eyes on Nicaragua as the next place for a revolution. There 
were two main goals to be achieved in Nicaragua. The first 
goal was for the Soviet Union to establish a base for 
further economic and geopolitical expansion into the 
region. The second goal was to create a successful 
revolution in Nicaragua to open the door to further export 
revolution into the Central American isthmus.21
                                               
21 G.W. Sand. Soviet Aims in Central America: the Case of Nicaragua. New York: Praeger publishers, 
1989, 20 
 In order for 
a revolution to be sparked in Nicaragua the Soviet Union 
knew that a rebellious group would first need to be formed 
and start a movement. The movement would need to lead 
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uprisings against those currently in power, and show a 
strong support for socialist ideology.   
 The Sandinista movement was exactly what the Soviet 
Union wanted it started as a product of anti-Somoza 
movements conducted by students in 1944-48.22 The Sandinista 
Party was also known as the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front, FSLN. The primary member and founder of the FSLN was 
Carlos Fonseca Amador, who during his time in high school, 
in Matagalpa, was introduced to Marxism. He joined the 
Nicaraguan Socialist party (PSN) in the 1950s, showing his 
support for communism. After high school Carlos Fonseca 
traveled to Managua to study at the National Autonomous 
University.23
                                               
22 John A. Booth. The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, 
138. 
 Fonseca became a leading member of the student 
government, and was also one of the editors of the school 
paper. Fonseca wrote about socialist ideology and openly 
showed his lack of support for the Somoza Regime. Because 
of his blatant articles, Fonseca was targeted and arrested 
after the assassination of President Somoza Garcia in 1956. 
In addition to Fonseca's arrest, many other student 
leftists were arrested. Fonseca was released after a month 
in prison. Following his release, "The PSN sent Fonseca to 
the Soviet Union in 1957, after which he wrote a pamphlet 
23 John A. Booth, 138 
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extolling socialism."24
 The Nicaraguan government deported Carlos Fonseca in 
1958 by the Nicaraguan Government and sent him to 
Guatemala. From Guatemala Fonseca eventually traveled to 
Cuba were he became "entranced with Castro's revolution."
 Upon returning to Nicaragua, Fonseca 
continued his protests on behalf of those who were still 
imprisoned, and was arrested on several accounts. Despite 
these arrests Fonseca continued to fight against what he 
believed to be a puppet regime, United States-controlled 
government. 
25
                                               
24 John A Booth, 138. 
 
Fonseca felt that he could organize a revolution like that 
of Cuba to oust the Somoza dynasty. The PSN, with its 
conservative nature, rejected Fonseca's attempts at a 
revolution. This led to Fonseca quitting the PSN. Fonseca 
continued to support and carry out activist movements, but 
he found them to be radical and most failed. In support of 
Fonseca's efforts, John Booth writes, "Carlos Fonseca 
Amador, however, pressed on; he organized a clandestine 
revolutionary network and cultivated Cuban Support." In 
1961, along with Tomas Borge and Silvo Mayorga, Fonseca 
formed the FLSN, which would become the revolutionary power 
in Nicaragua for the next eighteen years. This was one of 
25 John A Booth, 138. 
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Fonseca's greatest revolutionary successes, and it allowed 
him to continue the fight against Somoza and a government 
that had imprisoned him. 
The FSLN gained power and the support of many 
Nicaraguan citizens. However, Somoza was able to hold on to 
the political support of the United States. The United 
States kept on a course and did not waver in its support of 
the Somoza family until the presidency of Jimmy Carter in 
the late 1970s. The United States aid to the Somoza 
brothers was, from the United States' point of view, a way 
to promote pro-United States political stability in 
Nicaragua. As John Booth states in his study of the 
revolution,  
The theory was that aid could promote non-Communism, 
 pro-Americanism, and stability, which were viewed as 
 conducive to American security in the context of the 
 Cold War.26
 
  
The United States' support of the Somoza Dynasty was a 
means to justify its part in training and supporting a 
system of government that was far from democratic, but was 
rather a dictatorship. The United States fear of communism 
benefited the Somoza government.  
                                               
26, John A. Booth., 75. 
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In the end Somoza tied his arms behind his back in 
terms of keeping his family's hold on Nicaragua. In 
addition to the problems brought by a Russia-backed Cuba, 
there was internal strife caused by the Sandinista rebels. 
The Sandinista Party began using Augusto Sandino's name as 
a weapon against Somoza. This name represented a lack of 
support for the United States companies in Nicaragua and 
became a means for showing disgust for the puppet role that 
the Somozas were playing. The party was further 
strengthened by the ideas that Sandino had brought to 
battle. The battle cry of Sandino not only went against 
Somoza, but also Somoza's largest backer, the United States 
of America. These two reminders of Sandino brought 
difficulties to Somoza because they brought back a past 
that Somoza preferred be forgotten.  
It was clear to Somoza that the Sandinista Party was a 
Communist Party. Somoza believed that the communists were 
trying to grab hold of another country, like Cuba, and 
secure a communist foothold in Central America. He stated 
his displeasure for this in the following, 
In 1971, Carlos Fonseca Amador sent a message to the 
 Communist Party Congress in Moscow. He wanted to be 
 certain that the Communist Party knew of his loyalty 
 and devotion.27
 
  
                                               
27 Anastasio Somoza. Nicaragua Betrayed. Boston: Western Islands Publishers, 1980, 90. 
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This quote shows that Somoza was aware of the Sandinista's 
ties to communism. Somoza furthered this tie by stating 
that the Sandinistas as were the “successor(s) to the 
Bolshevik Revolution,” and that Fonseca was led only by 
Lenin’s ideas.28
 By this point in history many of the Nicaraguan people 
began to follow the propaganda of the FSLN. Due to the 
negative economic and political conditions in Nicaragua the 
citizens wanted a new leader and the FSLN was ready to lead 
them to one. The farmers of the northern hills saw no aid 
from the Somozan government and knew that their economic 
situation would soon collapse completely. The farmers of 
Nicaragua heard the stories of roads that Somoza had paved 
to his beaches while, they traveled down homemade paths and 
dreamed of a day when they would reap the same benefits as 
their leader. In 1969, the FSLN released a statement that 
called for the confiscation of capitalist and agricultural 
holdings, it also called for the nationalization of all of 
Somoza's properties; which in turn would cancel the Bryan-
 Throughout Somoza’s book he painted the 
FSLN as a puppet party (especially after Fonseca’s death), 
that was manipulated by not only the Soviet Union but more 
directly by Castro's Cuba. 
                                               
28  Anastasio Somoza, 90. 
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Chamorro Treaty of 1916.29
 In David Nolan’s, The Ideology of the Sandinistas and 
the Nicaraguan Revolution
 This demonstrated the power of 
the FSLN and increased the level of fear Somoza had in 
regards to his control over Nicaragua. 
30
… that the FSLN has sought to bring about major change 
 in Nicaragua and that this goal has been in large part 
 ideologically motivated.
 he examines primary documents of 
the FSLN to better understand what the party wanted to 
accomplish in its war against the Somoza government. He 
states the following,  
31
 
  
He showed this throughout his study of the FSLN and its 
members. 
 Nolan's work focused primarily on Fonseca and his 
ideological influences that led him to be the head of the 
party. The main influence for Fonseca was his socialist 
background. Fonseca felt that the use of Augusto Sandino 
would give Fonseca, and the FLSN, a better base from which 
to draw upon. Fonseca saw Sandino as a “true anti-
imperialist, whose ideology held the seeds of revolutionary 
class consciousness.”32
                                               
29 G.W. Sand, 20 
 As Fonseca’s movement continued, he 
30 David Nolan. The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution. Coral Gables: University 
of Miami, 1984. 
 
31 David Nolan, 8. 
32 David Nolan, 17. 
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used of the communist banner and the image of Sandino. This 
began to prove harder to fit into the growing ideology of 
the FSLN because Sandino was not a communist. To dismiss 
this conflict, Fonseca, and later his successor Humberto 
Ortega, simply omitted the fact that Sandino was not a 
communist. As Nolan wrote, “Ortega claimed Sandino as an 
anti-bourgeois, a class revolutionary dedicated to the same 
goal of social transformation as the FSLN.”33
 Problems emerged by using Sandino in the FSLN 
movement, the FLSN began in the 1970s to show signs of 
fracture. The differences that the party began to show 
spread into the fractioning of the party into three main 
groups. The three groups that emerged from, yet still under 
the FLSN banner, were the Proletarian Wing, the Prolonged 
People's War Group (GPP), and the Terceristas or Third 
Force Faction.
 Fonseca 
emphasized that this fact should be viewed as the focal 
point of the organization.  
34
                                               
33 David Nolan, 18. 
 The first two groups were still Marxist in 
their overall ideology. The difference in the groups was 
their tactics for fighting the war and their use of 
propaganda. 
34 John A Booth, 143. 
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 The Proletarian Wing, however, was trying to increase 
the overall mass of the revolution by organizing factory 
unions. They wanted to use the new industrialization 
classes to create these unions. Also the Proletarian Wing 
was under fire from the other two groups for its use of 
propaganda. As John Booth writes, "The other factions 
criticized the Proletarios (Proletarian Wing) for excessive 
'propagandism' for adherence to a 'traditional Marxist 
line…'"35
 The last group that came out of the split was that of 
the Terceristas who, more than the other groups, took a 
completely different line on the Marxist ideology of the 
FLSN. This group included groups such as the Social 
Democratic, and Social Christian Group.
 The GPP on the other hand took a more cautious 
approach to the war and was criticized for, at times, 
isolating itself from the people of the country. 
36
 With these gaps in the FLSN it was clear the FLSN 
would crumble because of its own differences. This 
surprisingly, did not happen, all of the groups of the FLSN 
stayed united enough to continue on with the mission to 
dethrone Somoza. Due to the ability of the FSLN to stay 
intact, the revolution against Somoza was able to continue.  
  
                                               
35 John A Booth, 143. 
36 John A Booth, 144. 
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 The reason for the continued FLSN front against Somoza 
was due to miscalculations by President Somoza Debayle in 
many of his actions. Somoza's biggest error was the killing 
of Pedro Joaguin Chammorro, who was a much loved journalist 
of the La Prensa.37 Chammorro's death sparked an extreme 
backlash toward the Somoza Regime from the right.38
 In addition to the anger sparked by Chammorro's 
murder, was the anger caused the funneling of international 
aid to the pocket of the Somoza Regime. The National Guard 
and Somoza after the 1972 earthquake stole aid money that 
was designed to help with the rebuilding and reimbursement 
costs of the earthquake. This selfish act pushed more and 
more conservatives and elite to oust the Somozan 
government. As the rest of the country's classes and 
political parties began to place pressure on Somoza, the 
FLSN took time to reunite their different groups and push 
Somoza out while his support was limited. 
 Many of 
the elite in Nicaragua, including Chammorro's parents, were 
unaffected by Somoza's killing of poor, lower class, 
Nicaraguans, but they were shocked by the action taken 
against one of their own.  
                                               
37 Benjamin Keen, and Keith Haynes, 473. 
38 Benjamin Keen, and Keith Haynes, 473. 
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 The United States had supported the Somoza Dynasty for 
much of the twentieth century in return for the involvement 
it was playing in Nicaraguan politics and for the aid it 
was receiving in the fight against communism. United States 
aid to the Somoza Regime rose from $1 million annually in 
1953 to $17.3 million annually in 1975.39 This funding was 
repaid in the eyes of the United States through Nicaragua's 
willingness to aid the fight against communism in Cuba. As 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle writes in his book, “My father, my 
brother, Luis, and I took part directly, indirectly, and 
openly to defeat Communism in Central America.”40
 The election of Jimmy Carter in 1977 was a turning 
point in the amount of aid the United States would give the 
Somoza Dynasty. Carter, who had always been an advocate for 
human rights, began to see Anastasio Somoza Debayle as a 
 This open 
attack towards communism led the United States to ask the 
Somoza Regime if they would be willing to help in efforts 
to overthrow Castro and the Cuban government. This was the 
path that led Nicaragua to support the 1961 Bay of Pigs 
Invasion. This involvement in a United States run military 
operation demonstrated Somoza's complete support of United 
States policy on communism.  
                                               
39 John Booth, 75. 
40Anastasio Somoza, 169. 
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threat to his continuation for promoting his human rights 
policies. Carter slowed the aid to Nicaragua because he 
wanted to begin distancing the United States. Carter knew 
that Somoza was losing his foothold with the FSLN, but 
Carter could not cut the ties completely because of 
economic constraints. The book Nicaragua: An Ally Under 
Siege, edited by Belden Bell, documents a decline of United 
States support under Carter. "The controversial assistance 
package currently being funneled through A.I.D. amounts to 
roughly $6.1 million… in 1978."41
 The timing of Carter's policies seemed to be a way for 
the United States to save face. The United States did not 
want the Latin American policy makers to blame it for the 
failing Somoza government. Moreover, the United States 
diplomatically distanced itself from Somoza in a way that 
it still had an anti-FLSN stance. This is seen through 
Carter's praise of Somoza's progress on human rights in 
President Somoza's visits to the United States in 1978. The 
irony of this praise was the fact that Somoza was not 
respecting human rights, yet in order to continue the anti-
 This amount was close to 
eleven million less that United States had given the 
Nicaragua in 1975.  
                                               
41 Belden Bell., ed. Nicaragua: An Ally Under Siege. Washington D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 
1978, 137. 
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communist ties with Somoza, Carter needed to show some 
human rights progress countries diplomacy. However, since 
open violations of human rights by Somoza and the National 
Guard increased the United States was forced to back off 
its full support for Somoza. This decline in support would 
be the undoing of the Somoza Dynasty as it was overthrown 
by the FSLN, with the United States standing idly by and 
watching. 
 The role that the United States played in fostering 
the revolution was clearly crucial in this series of pawn 
wars. Because of the United States long history in the 
region, such as the Monroe Doctrine and later the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States was 
fully able to use its powers of persuasion on those in 
power (Somoza Dynasty). The United States was able to 
accomplish what it felt it needed to do in the Latin 
American community. With that said, plans for an overthrow 
of Castro in Cuba were discussed and carried about by the 
United States with the help of the Somoza government. It is 
easy to see how the United States tipped the scales of war 
on the Nicaraguan people. This idea is enhanced in a 
statement made by the United States Ambassador to 
Nicaragua, James Theberge,  
 25 
 There are very few unchanging principles governing the 
 relations between nations. Some however do exist, and 
 for the Americans the Monroe Doctrine is one of the 
 most enduring of them all.42
 
 
In this statement it is easy to see the thought process of 
the United States in terms of using its power in the Latin 
American region. 
 Even when the United States enacted the "Good Neighbor 
policy"43 set up in the 1930s, by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
the United States did still influenced Nicaragua. Its 
influence was felt through both military force then by 
funding. The Good Neighbor Policy stated that the United 
States of America would not invest direct military action 
towards Latin American countries but would, "now extract 
voluntary cooperation from Latin American governments 
through diplomatic and economic means."44
 As the Nicaraguan Revolution ended in 1979, it seemed 
that the FSLN had succeeded. This successful revolution 
ended the reign of a power hungry dictator. However, the 
power of the United States in Nicaragua had as much to do 
with the fall of the Somoza Dynasty as it had to do with 
 This allowed the 
United States to help with wars in Nicaragua by helping to 
fund them rather then sending in troops.  
                                               
42 George Black. Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua. London: Zed Press, 
1981, 57. 
43 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 63. 
44 Peter H. Smith, 64. 
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the creation of the same dynasty. The United States started 
its involvement in Nicaragua for the sole reason of 
protecting United States based investments in the country. 
It continued this attempt to control Nicaragua even as it 
was forced out by Augusto Sandino and his troops, with the 
placing of Anastasio Somoza Garcia as head of the National 
Guard. 
 The twentieth century progressed and the policies that 
made intervention possible changed from the Monroe Doctrine 
to Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The United 
States was forced to battle its growing threat of communism 
by economic and political support in Latin America. As the 
United States aid funneled into the pockets of the Somoza 
Dynasty and the National Guard both groups became far too 
greedy. This greed soon lead to the growing backlash from 
both internal (FLSN and other political groups and 
classes), and the external (with the Soviet Union and Cuba) 
groups.  
 The United States, forced by the undeniable human 
rights violations by Somoza and his National Guard, was 
forced to distance itself from Somoza. Even with its action 
of reducing funding from the failed Somoza Dynasty, the 
United States still attempted to hold on in favor of those 
whose ideology was against communism, the FSLN. As the 
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Nicaraguan countryside was leveled and thousands of 
Nicaraguan people were killed in the final moments of the 
revolution the United States government was busily trying 
to figure out how to overthrow the new FLSN government.  
 The United States government not only was responsible 
for the Somozan Dynasty's hold in Nicaraguan for over 
thirty years, it was also responsible for the loss of the 
Nicaraguan government, by not funding Somoza when he had 
put himself in a lose-lose situation. The policies of the 
different eras in the United States-Nicaraguan relationship 
forced the United States to use many different techniques 
to gain control in the region. Due to the falling of Somoza 
President Carter was willing to accept defeat at the hand 
of the FSLN. However, his successor, President Ronald 
Reagan admittedly opposed the now communist, FSLN, led 
country.  
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